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Abstract The present paper aims to investigate whether
individuals with Asperger syndrome (AS) show global
humor processing deficits or whether humor comprehension
and appreciation depends on stimulus characteristics. Non-
verbal visual puns, semantic and Theory of Mind cartoons
were rated on comprehension, funniness and the punchlines
were explained. AS individuals did not differ to the control
group in humor appreciation of visual puns. However, they
had difficulty understanding and appreciating Theory of
Mind cartoons and provided mentalistic explanations less
frequently than controls suggesting that humor processing is
strongly related to the cognitive requirements that the stimuli
pose on the perceiver. Furthermore, AS individuals referred
in all conditions more frequently to non-joke relevant
details. Therefore, humor processing is also influenced by
their detail-oriented processing style.
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Introduction
Individuals with Asperger syndrome (AS) are known to
have problems in social interaction. Humor can be seen as
an important tool in social interaction, supporting rela-
tionships but also communicating indirectly opinions that
cannot be expressed overtly. In order to understand and
appreciate humorous stimuli, several cognitive abilities are
required, such as an abstract understanding of ideas and the
capacity to integrate information into a new concept (see
also below). The present study investigated humor pro-
cessing in individuals with AS and sought to identify the
underlying mechanisms that might lead to possible deficits
in processing and appreciating humor.
Early notions on humor skills in relation to individuals
with AS suggested that they do not understand humor
(Asperger 1944). Meanwhile, experimental and case report
studies on humor appreciation in individuals with AS, as
well as autism have lead to a more fine-grained picture:
individuals with autism and AS enjoy slapstick comedy and
simple jokes (Ricks and Wing 1975) and mildly autistic
adults have a good, albeit not very subtle, sense of humor
(Everard 1976). Recently, Werth et al. (2001) described a
female with high functioning autism (HFA) who conspic-
uously often produced puns, jokes, neologisms and word
plays as well as used riddles, teasing, sarcasm and irony. In
addition, several empirical investigations have shown that
certain forms of humor exist in individuals with autism or
AS: Van Bourgondien and Mesibov (1987) reported that
high-functioning autistic adults tell jokes that are on a lower
humor stage than their actual age (e.g., pre-riddles or jokes
based on lexical and phonological incongruities). Further-
more, Baron-Cohen (1997) demonstrated that individuals
with autism persistently fail to ‘‘get the joke’’ and that they
do not refer to the speaker’s intention to joke. St. James and
Tager-Flusberg (1994) showed that children with autism
can produce and appreciate humor to a limited extent in
naturalistic settings: no differences were found in earlier
forms of humor (e.g., humor based on rhyme, slapstick,
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funny sounds) but in nonverbal incongruity and riddles
(children with autism produced no riddles at all). Another
study showed children with autism laugh as much as chil-
dren with Down’s syndrome in response to tickling and
slapstick humor, but exhibit less laughter in response to
socially inappropriate acts (Reddy et al. 2002). In a more
experimental setting, two studies showed that comprehen-
sion of humorous material is poorer in individuals with AS
or autism than controls (Ozonoff and Miller 1996; Emerich
et al. 2003). The participants had to choose one out of five
possible funny joke endings. Individuals with AS had
poorer comprehension of cartoons and jokes. Instead of
choosing the correct funny ending, they most frequently
chose humorous, but not coherent endings.
The aim of the present study is to establish which cog-
nitive or affective deficits cause impairments in humor
processing in individuals with AS and how strongly humor
processing in individuals depends on cognitive require-
ments the stimuli pose on the perceiver. Differences in the
stimuli and tasks used in previous studies might have lead
to different conclusions: Generally, it is assumed that those
individuals with AS and autism who have highly developed
linguistic and computational abilities approach humor from
a more cognitive/intellectual perspective and are able to
grasp the cognitive basis of humor (e.g., such as recog-
nizing violations of linguistic and logical principles; for a
review, see Lyons and Fitzgerald 2004). However, the
underlying mechanisms for the impairments, particularly in
more complex forms of humor, are controversially dis-
cussed: for example, St. James and Tager-Flusberg (1994)
assumed that the reduced humor processing skills derive
from difficulties in social-cognitive deficits in understand-
ing mental states (see also Baron-Cohen et al. 1993),
whereas Reddy et al. (2002) assumed that difficulties in
mutual attention and emotion sharing cause these effects
rather than symbolic and meta-representational skills.
Emerich et al. (2003) claimed that deficits in humor pro-
cessing arise due to impairments in cognitive flexibility and
coherence building, as these skills are necessary in order to
reinterpret the meaning of parts of the joke.1
Which cognitive processes are necessary in order to
‘‘get’’ a joke? According to psychological and also cogni-
tive-linguistic humor theories an incongruity, i.e., a conflict
between two initially opposed scripts or schemas, has to be
detected and then playfully resolved by recognizing a
relation between the two scripts (e.g., Suls 1972; Shultz
1976; McGhee et al. 1990; Attardo and Raskin 1991). In
order to resolve an incongruity, cognitive rules, also called
logical mechanism (LM) have to be recognized (e.g., that a
joke is based on role exchange or analogy, etc.). LMs are of
particular interest in the present study. Previous studies
(Samson et al. 2008; Samson 2009) showed that different
LMs have different cognitive requirements which were
shown to influence neural activation patterns. Visual puns
(PUN, which are based on one visual element simulta-
neously evoking two meanings) were shown to evoke more
activation in the visual cortex whereas TOM cartoons
(TOM, they require additional mentalizing skills in order to
be understood: it has to be recognized that one character
portrayed in the cartoon has a false mental state) require
more involvement of so-called ‘‘mentalizing areas’’ [e.g.,
medial prefrontal cortex, temporo-parietal junction (TPJ)].
Semantic cartoons (SEM: the incongruity is based on pure
semantic (not visual) relations between two scripts and the
incongruity can be resolved by applying a LM, such as role
reversal, juxtaposition or exaggeration) evoke activation in
the typical humor processing areas (e.g., inferior frontal
gyrus, TPJ, see Samson et al. 2008). The three groups of
cartoons were also shown to be processed differently by
subjects with varying degrees of empathizing skills: for
example, people with lower empathizing skills tend to give
fewer emotional/motivational and mentalistic explanations,
particularly in TOM cartoons when asked to explain why
they think a cartoon is funny (Samson 2009).
The present study aims to investigate whether humor
processing in individuals with AS is generally limited or
whether it depends on stimuli characteristics, i.e., the LM
which is the cognitive rule indicating how the incongruity
of a joke has to be resolved: If humor processing is gen-
erally limited in all three groups of cartoons, this would
show that individuals with AS have problems resolving the
incongruity independent of the cognitive requirements that
different LMs pose. This would mean that individuals with
AS have a general deficit in manipulating and integrating
information, which might be caused by a weak central
coherence and less cognitive flexibility (Frith 1989; Frith
and Happe´ 1994; Happe´ 1999). On the other hand, it is
possible that individuals with AS do not have problems
resolving the incongruity of PUNs, but as soon as mental
states have to be attributed in order to get the joke they
might have difficulties in humor comprehension. As TOM
cartoons explicitly require mind-reading or mentalizing
skills to be correctly understood and if the only deficit in
humor appreciation is in TOM cartoons, limited mind-
reading skills might be the main factor leading to humor
deficits (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985; Baron-Cohen 1988;
Happe´ 1993; Tager-Flusberg 1993).
Furthermore, it will be investigated whether the ‘‘local
bias’’ affects humor processing: In several studies, individ-
uals with AS were shown to focus more on details (‘‘local
bias’’) than on the global meaning of stimuli (e.g., Plaisted
1 If the incongruent element of a joke is presented in the end of a
verbal joke, people have to trace back to the information given in the
beginning of the joke in order to reinterpret the already heard/read
information in a funny way.
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et al. 1998, 2003; O‘Riordan 2004; Happe´ 1996; Bo¨lte et al.
2007, 2008; Mu¨ller and Nussbeck 2008). This peculiarity
might influence humor processing when subjects concen-
trate more on visual details of a cartoon without getting the
global meaning of the joke. Therefore, humor processing in
the present experiment is not only investigated by asking for
comprehension and funniness ratings but also by taking into
account explanations provided by the participants as to why
they think a cartoon is funny. Explanations can illuminate
the underlying cognitive processes in more detail than rating
scales (e.g., Loizu 2006; Samson 2009). They can not only
show whether individuals with AS focus more on (e.g.,
visual) details in contrast to the global meaning of the joke
but also whether they refer to (false) mental states of the joke
characters.
One reason why individuals with AS miss the punchline
of jokes might be their reduced ability to read social cues in
social interaction conditions (Baron-Cohen 1997). How-
ever, in the present approach, humor processing is inves-
tigated independently of the influence of social context and
social cues: as the experiment was conducted online, sub-
jects could participate from the comfort of their homes.
Three stimulus conditions that posed different cognitive
requirements were used: non-verbal, single frame cartoons
that differ in their LM—PUN, SEM and TOM. Addition-
ally, a control condition was presented that consisted of
unfunny pictures containing an incongruity that could not
be resolved meaningfully (INC). The comparison of INC
versus the three cartoon conditions was intended to reveal
the ability to discriminate unfunny from funny materials.
Furthermore, individuals with AS are described as
having low empathizing abilities (attribution of mental
states to others and response with an appropriate emotion)
and sometimes higher systemizing abilities (comprehen-
sion for systems and its behavior Baron-Cohen 1995, 2002;
Wakabayashi et al. 2007). Dziobek et al. (2008) recently
showed that individuals with AS are only impaired in
cognitive empathy and not in emotional empathy. How-
ever, as individuals with AS appear to score differently on
empathizing and systemizing (see Baron-Cohen et al. 2003;
Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004; Wakabayashi et al.
2007), these scales were assessed as well in order to get
additional information about the cognitive skills of indi-
viduals with AS.
Method
Participants
Individuals with AS were recruited via several clinical
institutions, information and consulting centers for indi-
viduals with AS, in Germany, Austria and Switzerland.
Only individuals with a confirmation (e.g., of a psycho-
therapist) of the diagnosis (ICD-10: F84.5) were included
into the study (N = 19). They had an average Autism-
Spectrum Quotient (AQ) of 24.11 (SD = 3.71, range from
162 to 30) measured with the short German version of the
AQ which has a cut-off score of 17 for individuals with AS
(AQ-k, Freitag et al. 2007). The control group was
recruited via mailing lists at Swiss and German universi-
ties. In total, 128 subjects participated in the online study
with a mean age of 25.23 years (range from 19 to 50). The
109 control participants (age M = 24.99, SD = 5.67) and
the 19 individuals with an AS diagnosis (age M = 27.79,
SD = 8.28) did not differ regarding their age [F(1,127) =
3.34, p [ .05]. The control group consisted of 61.5%
females and the AS group of 52.6%. The distribution of
males and females did not differ significantly between the
two groups [v2(1) = .527, p [ .05]. The two groups did
not differ regarding their educational level: 78% of the
individuals with AS and 92% of the control group were
students or had a University degree [v2(1) = 2.90,
p [ .05].
Material
Stimuli
Three types of non-verbal funny cartoons differing in their
LM were used: visual puns (PUN), semantic cartoons
(SEM) and Theory of Mind cartoons (TOM; see Fig. 1).
PUNs have in common, that one visual element evokes
two scripts, that is, has two meanings. Therefore the
incongruity-resolution is visual as well as semantic. SEMs
are based on pure semantic relationships, no visual rela-
tionships are essential humor-carrying elements, and the
joke can be told instead of drawn. Several LMs are sub-
sumed in this category, for example role reversal, analogy,
or exaggeration. The third stimuli group consists of car-
toons where it is necessary to attribute false mental states to
the characters portrayed in the cartoons. Therefore men-
talizing abilities are required in order to understand the
cartoon. In these TOM cartoons the incongruity-resolution
is also semantic and not visual.
Furthermore, a non-funny control condition was pre-
sented containing an irresolvable incongruity (INC). These
cartoons are perceived to be non-funny and have high
residual incongruity (see Samson et al. 2008). This stim-
ulus condition was used as a control for real or pretended
understanding of the cartoons. In order to avoid humor
fatigue effects (i.e., a decrease in the funniness response
2 Although Freitag et al. (2007) postulated that individuals with AS
score on the AQ-k at least with 17, we included one individual with
AS with an AQ-k score of 16 as she had a valid diagnosis.
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with increasing number of stimuli, see for example
Forabosco 1994) eight stimuli per cartoon condition and
four INCs were selected randomly out of a pool of 120
stimuli used in prior studies (e.g., Samson et al. 2008).
Questionnaires
Empathizing and Systemizing
Short German versions of the empathizing and systemizing
scales (Samson and Huber 2009, which was developed on
the basis of the original long versions by Baron-Cohen
et al. 2003; Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004) consist
of 13 empathizing items (e.g., ‘‘I can easily tell if someone
else is interested in or bored with what I am saying’’), 13
systemizing items (e.g., ‘‘I do not enjoy games that involve
a high degree of strategy’’) and 11 filler items. The short
German version proved to be a reliable (e.g., high retest-
reliability), consistent and stable instrument (see Samson
and Huber 2009). The participants had to answer how
strongly they agree with the statements on a 4-point scale.
The answers were then recoded so that the strongest
empathizing or systemizing response gets 2 points, a strong
response 1 point and the two others 0 points.
Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ, Baron-Cohen et al. 2001)
The German short version of the AQ (AQ-k, with 33 items;
Freitag et al. 2007) was used here as an additional measure
to check the AS diagnosis. It is a questionnaire which
covers domains connected with the autism spectrum and
includes social skills, communication skills, imagination,
attention to detail, and attention switching/tolerance of
change. The participants had to answer how strongly they
agree on a 4-point scale. One point to the overall score was
given, if the answer was on the upper half of the scale. The
AQ-k showed a good discriminative validity and good
screening properties at a cut-off score of 17 for individuals
with AS (Freitag et al. 2007).
Procedure
First, several clinical institutions in Germany, Austria and
Switzerland and information and consulting centers were
contacted to recruit individuals with AS. The control group
was recruited via mailing lists at Swiss and German uni-
versities. People interested in taking part in the study were
invited to write an email to us in order to get an individual
password to have access to the online humor experiment.
Once logged in, they received instructions to rate each
cartoon for comprehension (yes/no), for funniness on a
6-point scale (from 0 to 5) and to explain in writing why
they thought a cartoon is funny or to explain the punchline.
Before the humor experiment started, they were asked to
fill in the short German version of the empathizing and
systemizing questionnaire (Samson and Huber 2009).
Subsequently 29 stimuli (24 funny cartoons and four con-
trol stimuli and one warm-up) were presented in random
order. At the end of the experiment, the participants had to
indicate whether they had been diagnosed as having AS.
Furthermore, they were asked to indicate where and by
whom they were diagnosed. After this procedure, the
individuals with AS were invited to fill in the AQ-k online.
Results
Thirty-two individuals indicated they had an AS diagnosis,
however, only those were included in the analysis for whom
(1) there was obtained an official confirmation of the AS
diagnosis (ICD-10: F84.5, e.g., by a psychiatrist), and (2)
AQ-k scores (N = 19) were available. Individuals with AS
had significantly lower empathizing [F(1, 127) = 60.51,
p \ .001] and higher systemizing scores [F(1, 127) =
11.52, p \ .001] than the control group (see Table 1) which
Fig. 1 Examples of the stimuli used in the study. a A picture
containing an irresolvable incongruity (INC). b A visual pun (PUN):
one visual element (the diagonal line) can stand for the sea (activated
through the fin) or the mountain (activated trough the skis). c A
semantic cartoon (SEM): the joke is based on pure semantic relations
and not on visual resemblance, as in PUNs: the patient has died which
can be seen on the monitor in the form of an angel flying away. There
is no visual resemblance between the angel and the line which
indicates no heartbeat. In order to understand the joke one does not
have to refer to (false) mental states. d A Theory of Mind (TOM)
cartoon: In order to get the joke, it is necessary to activate mentalizing
abilities, namely, understand that the woman does not know what will
happen to her, while the man knows what will happen. Cartoons:
Copyright by Oswald Huber. Permission to use was granted
J Autism Dev Disord (2010) 40:438–447 441
123
is in line with Baron-Cohen et al. (2003) and Baron-Cohen
and Wheelwright (2004). The two scales correlate nega-
tively [r(128) = -.25, p \ .01] if all participants (individ-
uals with AS and control group) were included due to the
typical pattern of low empathizing and (commonly) higher
systemizing scores in individuals with AS. Considering only
the control sample, empathizing and systemizing did not
correlate significantly [r(109) = -.09, p = .37] which is to
be expected as they are described as to be independent
psychological dimensions by Baron-Cohen (2002) and
Baron-Cohen and colleagues (2003, 2004; see Table 1).
Humor Ratings
In the next step, comprehension and funniness ratings were
analyzed by means of 2 9 4 repeated measure ANOVAs
with AS versus control group as a between-subjects factor
and the four stimulus conditions as a within-subjects factor,
followed by Bonferroni-adjusted single comparisons.
Gender was included as a covariate. If the Mauchly’s test
of sphericity did not show equality of the variances, a
Greenhouse Geisser correction was applied.
Comprehension
First, we compared comprehension ratings for the three
cartoon conditions and the control condition items (pictures
containing an irresolvable incongruity, INC). Therefore,
the mean comprehension ratings for the INC condition, as
well as for each of the humor condition were computed.
The INC condition had the lowest comprehension ratings,
followed by PUNs, SEMs and TOMs (see Table 2).
A repeated measure analysis showed a significant main
effect for the stimulus conditions (Mauchly’s W = .61,
v2(5) = 61.90, p \ .001; Greenhouse Geisser F(2.23,
278.11) = 16.35, p \ .001). Single comparisons revealed
that all stimulus conditions differed significantly from each
other (p \ .001), except for the SEM and TOM condition.
Neither the interaction of stimulus conditions and groups
(controls vs. individuals with AS) nor the interaction of
stimulus conditions with gender was significant. Over all
four stimulus conditions, individuals with AS had lower
comprehension ratings [F(1, 126) = 16.17, p \ .001],
indicating that individuals with AS understood all humor
conditions less well than the control group. Also gender
showed a significant effect in the between-subjects effects
[F(1, 126) = 9.48, p \ .01], indicating that females had
slightly lower comprehension ratings than males. However,
the effect of AS versus the control group was stronger than
the effect of gender. Although the control condition items
(irresolvable incongruities) were not intended to be funny
(pre-examinations showed that they were not perceived to
be funny, see Samson et al. 2008), participants sometimes
rated the cartoons as understood, although they were not
intended to be rated as jokes. Reasons for rating these
control cartoons as understood, could have arisen as par-
ticipants were informed that the experiment was a study of
humor (so the participants assumed that they were sup-
posed to find a punchline and judged the irresolvable
incongruities as jokes) as well as social desirability (sense
of humor is generally perceived to be a socially desirable
personality characteristic, see Martin 2006). However, this
poses no problem for the further analyses on humor
appreciation, since only the understood cartoons and non-
understood control stimuli were taken into account.
In order to analyze whether individuals with AS dis-
criminate between funny materials and the pictures con-
taining irresolvable incongruities, the mean comprehension
scores of the control condition were subtracted from the
mean comprehension score of all funny cartoons. Individu-
als with AS (M = .36, SD = .27) did not differ significantly
from the control group (M = .37, SD = .27, F(1, 127) =
.06, p = .80) which suggests that individuals with AS have
no general difficulties discriminating funny stimuli from
unfunny stimuli (i.e., independent of a social context).
Funniness
For the analysis of humor appreciation, the mean funniness
ratings of the non-understood control condition (INC) as
well as of the understood cartoons were computed (see
Table 2). A 2 9 4 repeated measure analysis with gender
as covariate revealed a significant main effect for the
stimulus conditions (Mauchly’s W = .79, v2(5) = 26.15,
p \ .001; Greenhouse Geisser [F(2.61, 303.18] = 13.31,
Table 1 Mean empathizing and systemizing scores for the individ-
uals with AS and the control group
Controls (N = 109) AS (N = 19)
Empathizing (M, SD) 13.40 (5.45) 3.37 (3.20)
Systemizing (M, SD) 8.76 (4.92) 12.89 (4.76)
Table 2 Means and standard deviations for comprehension and
funniness ratings of individuals with AS (N = 19) and the control
group (N = 109) for PUN, SEM and TOM cartoons and the control
condition (INC)
INC M (SD) PUN M (SD) SEM M (SD) TOM M (SD)
Comprehension
Controls .41 (.27) .69 (.23) .82 (.17) .83 (.19)
AS .26 (.21) .48 (.22) .69 (.23) .68 (.22)
Funniness
Controls 1.70 (.83) 3.52 (.94) 4.10 (.97) 4.34 (.95)
AS 1.76 (1.03) 3.08 (1.31) 3.19 1.13) 3.36 (1.23)
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p \ .001). Funniness scores were lowest for the INC con-
dition and higher for PUN, to SEM, to TOM, in that order.
Funniness ratings differed significantly between all stimu-
lus conditions (p \ .001, Bonferroni-corrected), except for
the comparison between SEM and TOM cartoons for which
there was no significant difference. Furthermore, the
interaction of the stimulus conditions and groups (controls
vs. individuals with AS) was significant [Greenhouse
Geisser (F(2.61, 303.18) = 7.68, p \ .001)]. One-way
ANOVA’s yielded no significant differences in the INC
and PUN condition between individuals with AS and the
controls. However, the control group rated SEM [F(1,
126) = 10.76, p \ .01] and TOM cartoons [F(1, 126) =
13.57, p \ .001] as significantly funnier than individuals
with AS. Over all four stimulus conditions, individuals
with AS had significantly lower funniness ratings [F(1,
116) = 7.89, p \ .01]. The interaction of stimulus condi-
tions with gender was not significant and males and
females did not differ in their funniness ratings over all
stimulus conditions.
Subsequently, it was of interest whether the individuals
with AS did profit from additional social cues, which are
more prominent in SEMs in contrast to PUNs and most
prominent in TOMs, as the punchlines in TOM cartoons
are based on false mental states. In the control group, the
funniness ratings were greater in SEM cartoons, compared
to PUN cartoons [t(107) = 7.00, p \ .001] but not for
individuals with AS [t(18) = .54, p = .60]. The same was
observed for the comparison between SEM and TOM
cartoons: in the control group, funniness ratings increased
if the punchline was based on false mental states [t(106) =
3.57, p \ .001] but not in individuals with AS [t(18) = .80,
p = .44]. Therefore, individuals with AS perceive all three
humorous cartoon conditions on the same level of funni-
ness. This indicates that they do not profit from social cues
and jokes about false mental states, which were described
in previous studies as funniness enhancing factors (Samson
et al. 2008).
Humor Explanations
The explanations and comments given by each participant
were analyzed qualitatively: The explanations were rated
for whether someone referred to details that were irrelevant
for the humor of the cartoon and whether mentalistic
explanations were given.
Coding Procedure
The explanations of the PUN, SEM and TOM cartoons (24
per participant) were coded binomially (yes/no) for the two
following criteria: Detail orientation: It was coded whether
the focus of the explanation was on features of the cartoon
that are not joke relevant, for example that ‘‘…a runway
was too short for an airplane to take off …’’ or that ‘‘…a
wall could not stand because of the lack of a base…’’.
Mentalistic explanation: In order to get a score here, par-
ticipants had to refer to false mental states, e.g., to a false
belief of a character portrayed in the cartoon (e.g.,
‘‘…person X does not know what person Y is doing behind
his back…’’). As it might be possible for participants to
give a wrong mentalistic explanation, it was coded inde-
pendently from the correctness of the explanation whether
participants referred to false mental states at all.
To compute inter-rater reliability for detail orientation
and mentalistic explanations, two cartoons per condition
(i.e., in total 870 explanations, which is 30% of the total of
2,856 explanations) were randomly selected and coded by a
second rater. In the coding procedure, the two coders did
not know whether the participants were individuals with
AS or part of the control group. Inter-rater reliability was
satisfactorily high for detail oriented explanations in general
(Kappa = .80), PUNs (Kappa = .83), SEM (Kappa =
.74) and TOM cartoons (Kappa = .86). The same holds for
mentalistic explanations in general (Kappa = .92), PUN
(Kappa = .73), SEM (Kappa = .86) and TOM cartoons
(Kappa = .94; usually, a Kappa of .70 is considered as
very satisfactory).
Detail Orientation
For each individual, the number of the detail-oriented
explanations was summarized per each cartoon group. A
2 9 3 repeated measure analysis with the three cartoon
conditions as within-subject variable, groups (controls vs.
individuals with AS) as between-subjects variable and
gender as covariate revealed no significant main effect for
the stimulus conditions. Neither the interaction of the
stimuli conditions and groups (controls vs. individuals with
AS) nor the interaction with gender was significant. Over
all cartoon conditions, individuals with AS referred sig-
nificantly more often to non-joke relevant details [F(1,
125) = 31.40, p \ .001], indicating that in each cartoon
condition, individuals with AS gave more detail-oriented
explanations than the control group. However, there was no
effect of gender over all cartoon conditions. For means and
standard deviations see Table 3.
Mentalistic Explanations
For each individual, the number of the mentalistic expla-
nations was summarized for each cartoon group. A 2 9 3
repeated measures analysis with the stimulus conditions as
within-subject variable, groups (controls vs. individuals
with AS) as between-subjects variable and gender as
covariate revealed a significant main effect for the cartoon
J Autism Dev Disord (2010) 40:438–447 443
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conditions (Mauchly’s W = .27, v2(2) = 165.49, p \ .001;
Greenhouse Geisser [F(1.15, 144.08) = 13.55, p \ .001].
Single comparisons revealed that in TOM cartoons more
mentalistic explanations were given than in PUN cartoons
[t(127) = 16.22, p \ .001] or in SEM cartoons [t(127) =
16.17, p \ .001], whereas PUN and SEM did not differ
significantly from each other in the number of mentalistic
explanations provided. The interaction of the three cartoon
conditions and groups (controls vs. individuals with AS)
was significant [Greenhouse Geisser (F(1.15, 144.08) =
6.513, p \ .01)] but the interaction of stimulus conditions
with gender was not significant. Over all three cartoon
conditions, individuals with AS gave significantly fewer
mentalistic explanations [F(1, 125) = 10.05, p \ .01].
This is mainly due to the difference in the TOM condition
as individuals with AS and the controls did not differ in the
PUN and SEM condition. The main finding here is that the
control group gave significantly more mentalistic expla-
nations in TOM cartoons than individuals with AS [F(1,
127) = 8.791, p \ .01]. There was no effect of gender over
all cartoon conditions.
Discussion
The results of the present study show that individuals with
AS have more difficulties than the control group in com-
prehending humorous material (i.e., cognitive humor pro-
cessing), independent of the LM. However, as the
proportion of understood cartoons to non-understood pic-
tures containing an irresolvable incongruity did not differ
between individuals with AS and controls, it can be con-
cluded that the ability to discriminate unfunny from funny
materials does not differ between the two groups. Further-
more, individuals with AS rate SEM and TOM cartoons as
significantly less funny than controls which indicates
reduced affective humor processing. While there was an
increase in funniness ratings from PUN to SEM to TOM due
to a profit from social cues as funniness enhancers in the
control group, this increase was not found in individuals
with AS, which means that they do not benefit from addi-
tional social aspects as funniness enhancing factors, such as
taking into account mental states and attributing false
mental states (Samson et al. 2008). This was also shown by
taking the explanations into account: Whereas TOM car-
toons provoked more mentalistic explanations in contrast to
PUN and SEM cartoons, individuals with AS referred less
frequently to false mental states, in particular in the TOM
condition and never in the PUN condition. Interestingly,
even in the PUN condition, controls spontaneously referred
to false mental states, although this was not required in
order to get the joke. Furthermore, significant differences
between individuals with AS and controls were found
regarding the attention to detail in their explanations:
Independent of the LM, individuals with AS more often
focused on non-joke relevant details indicating that inde-
pendent of the stimulus characteristics, individuals with AS
process humorous stimuli differently.
The finding that individuals with AS show overall lower
comprehension ratings might support the view of Emerich
et al. (2003) that weak central coherence and less cognitive
flexibility influence humor processing in individuals with
AS. Also, their focus on visual details is supporting this
view. This is in line with the generally good performance in
visual search described in the literature (e.g., Bo¨lte et al.
2008). However, it is not clear whether such a detail ori-
ented processing style leads to a failure in understanding the
global meaning of the joke or whether individuals with AS
are even amused by such detail focused explanations. A
reanalysis of the detail-oriented explanations of the indi-
viduals with AS (in total 111 explanations) showed that
both is possible: Across the 24 cartoons, individuals with
AS indicated more frequently that they understood the
cartoon (M = 2.92, SD = 1.67) in contrast to that they did
not understand the cartoon (M = 1.67, SD = 1.63; t(23) =
2.363, p \ .05), which shows that they are sometimes
amused about such detail-focused explanations or that they
refer to them additionally. However, in some cases it was
clear that the focus on details leads to a failure in getting the
joke (e.g., ‘‘…if this object is moving on the water, there is a
lack of waves indicating this movement…, however, I don’t
get it’’). Abstractions and simplifications in the drawing
style such as, for example, omitting visual details (e.g.,
waves on the water indicating movement) or simple lines
instead of detailed and realistic drawings are typical for
visual humor and are usually not part of further conscious
considerations in normally developing individuals. Fur-
thermore, it was striking how often the detail oriented-
explanations of individuals with AS were accompanied by
statements that a certain situation is just ‘‘not possible’’ or
‘‘not realistic’’. This seems to indicate a problem with
switching from a bona-fide reality-based mode to a non-
bona-fide joke mode. Particularly in cartoons, many aspects
Table 3 Means and standard deviations for detail orientation and
reference to false mentalistic states in the explanations of individuals
with AS (N = 19) and the control group (N = 109) for PUN, SEM
and TOM cartoons
PUN M (SD) SEM M (SD) TOM M (SD)
Detail orientation
Controls .33 (.67) .30 (.71) .20 (.49)
AS 1.00 (.88) 1.16 (1.12) 1.00 (1.33)
Mentalistic explanations
Controls .18 (.41) .23 (.53) 3.07 (1.96)
AS .00 (.00) .05 (.23) 1.68 (1.38)
444 J Autism Dev Disord (2010) 40:438–447
123
are present that are not realistic (e.g., speaking animals) or
drawn in an abstract (unrealistic) style and require a
momentary, partial suspension of disbelief. The ability to do
this switch is part of normal communicative competence
and normally developing individuals do not refer to the
physical impossibility of a wall that can not stand without
its base, for example, when the level of detail in a cartoon
does not require the explicit incorporation of such a base.
We assume that individuals with AS are less able to suspend
disbelief in a humorous context and that they are more
reality-oriented. However, this assumption as well as the
relationship of humor appreciation and the detail-oriented
processing style needs to be investigated further.
This study shows not only that a weak central coher-
ence, less cognitive flexibility and a local bias might be
responsible for certain deficits in humor processing, but
also that social cognitive deficits, such as the inability to
read minds, lead to a different pattern in humor processing:
individuals with AS did not profit from social involvement
as a factor increasing the perceived funniness (Samson
et al. 2008), but rated PUN, SEM and TOM on the same
funniness level. The often postulated influence of limited
mind-reading skills on humor processing in individuals
with AS is also attested by the circumstance that they
referred less often to false mental states of the characters
portrayed, particularly in TOM cartoons.
As PUN, SEM and TOM cartoons require different
cognitive processes to be understood (see Samson et al.
2008) and as they were processed differently by individuals
with AS from those in the control group, we suggest that
differences between the studies on humor in individuals
with AS are, inter alia, due to differences in the stimulus
material. As a key result of the present study, we recom-
mend controlling stimuli for their cognitive requirements in
more detail for future studies.
The lower comprehension and funniness ratings raise
the question whether this response behavior might be
traced back to less socially desirable answer tendencies in
individuals with AS (a social desirable answer would be to
find the jokes funny and comprehend them in order to seem
not humorless). Although we cannot exclude this possi-
bility, a recent study showed that individuals with AS
performed at a comparable level to controls on a social
desirability scale (Dziobek et al. 2008). Furthermore, it is
not likely that individuals with AS who participated in this
study were less motivated than the control group to fill in
the online questionnaires and to rate the cartoons.
Some limitations of the present study have to be men-
tioned. For example, the male–female ratio of the AS group
is not representative of what would be found in a true
community sample. Although gender revealed to have only
an overall effect on comprehensibility which was weaker
than the difference between individuals with AS and the
control group, it cannot be excluded that—if more male
individuals with AS would have participated in the
experiment—the differences found would have been even
more pronounced. A further point is that the data were
collected online: although Internet-based studies are usu-
ally equally reliable and valid as paper–pencil based
methods (more traditional strategies) and samples collected
via the Internet usually show more diversity than other
samples (e.g., Gosling et al. 2004, see also Birnbaum
2000), this procedure does not allow to collect additional
data, for example, on facial expressions. Furthermore, it
was not asked for other parameters such as the IQ or
psychiatric disorders other than AS. Future studies should
pay more attention to factors that might influence humor
processing in general as well as differences between the
control group and individuals with AS.
To conclude, we assume that the reduced humor appre-
ciation in individuals with AS depends on the cognitive
requirements that the stimuli pose on the perceiver, since
they do not differ in the funniness rating in the PUN con-
dition. However, whereas controls profit from social fun-
niness-enhancing factors in the SEM and TOM condition,
individuals with AS do not. Their enjoyment remains on the
same level in all three stimulus conditions. This means that
they show less emotional responsiveness towards poten-
tially-funny stimuli where social cognition (such as
ascribing false mental states) is involved. This is in line with
the findings of Baron-Cohen (1988, 1997); Baron-Cohen
et al. (1985); Happe´ (1993) or Tager-Flusberg (1993).
Furthermore, the lower cognitive flexibility (Frith 1989;
Frith and Happe´ 1994; Happe´ 1999) leads to lower com-
prehension in general. Another key result is that individuals
with AS more often show a focus on non-humor relevant
details than the controls. This detail-oriented processing
style sometimes leads to the failure in getting the joke.
However, from our data it can be suggested that as a con-
sequence of this processing style, other aspects of the
humorous stimuli lead to amusement than in normally
developed individuals. Additionally, it is possible that
individuals with AS possess a more reality based processing
style (bona-fide reality-based). This processing style might
lead to less humor enjoyment as well. This opens a variety
of new research questions, for example, what leads to this
more reality oriented processing style and whether other
domains than humor are affected as well.
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